In this paper, we provide evidence of the effects of teacher's pay increases on students' learning in the context of developing countries (São Paulo state public education). We explore the variation in teachers' pay, given by the rule of additional salaries by length of service (quinquennium rule). We observed each teacher's eligibility for salary increases and explored the differences in the teachers' admission date throughout the year to calculate the exposure time of teachers treated at higher salaries. We employ a difference-indifferences strategy to control for unobserved characteristics of teachers belonging to different admission cohorts. Our results are in line with empirical literature: salary increases for incumbent teachers do not seem to affect their productivity and, therefore, are not capable of impacting student learning in basic education.
Introduction and Literature Review
There is a consensus that teacher quality is the most important input to improve student learning and reduce educational inequalities (Hanushek & Raymond, 2005) . For this reason, it is extremely important to investigate the effectiveness of public policies intended to attract and retain good professionals for educational systems and to improve the productivity of incumbent teachers.
One of these policies refers to the remuneration of teachers. From a theoretical point of view, higher salaries would attract more people to the teaching career.
The greater number of professionals would have the potential to raise the average quality of teachers, since educational systems could be more selective in hiring. It could still raise the level of effort, reduce turnover and absenteeism, if the Submitted on 11 January 2018; Reviewed on 27 September 2018 and experience. In addition, most of these studies use empirical strategies that exploit differences in teacher salaries across districts or different educational systems. It can lead to misleading results, since wage increases interventions should act in other dimensions that also affect school results.
In this article, we study the effects of teachers' salaries on students' proficiency in São Paulo, Brazil, taking advantage of the existence of a rule of wage variation based on tenure (the so-called quinquennial rule). For a specific sample of teachers and, under certain hypotheses, this rule provides an exogenous variation in teachers' salaries. This article contributes to the literature with consistent estimates of the relationship between the level of regular wages and learning in the case of developing countries. The quinquennial rule ensures that every five years of service time, teachers receive a 5% increase in regular salary. Thus, we used the date of admission of teachers to evaluate their eligibility for salary increase and the time of exposure of teachers who received higher salaries, exploring the differences in the timing of hiring the teachers throughout the year.
Our results are in line with International empirical literature: wage increase for incumbent teachers seems not to affect their productivity and is not able to impact student learning in basic education.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the characteristics of the salary policy of the São Paulo State. Sections 3 and 4 present data, descriptive statistics and empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the results and section 6 concludes.
Teacher Career in São Paulo
According to data from the School Census, the São Paulo educational system is responsible for serving 2.0 million primary school students and 1.6 million high school students, by about 30% of Brazilian students. It employs almost 150,000 teachers (70% have employment stability) to teach in elementary school (1 st to 5 th years, PEB I career) and in the second cycle of primary education (6 th to 9 th grade) or high School (PEB II career).
Teacher remuneration is composed of basic salary and some rewards, associated with qualification and tenure. Teachers' salaries rise according to their five-level classification of the teacher evaluation. They are classified in the first level when they are hired (level I) and the change to higher levels could occur through academic or non-academic ways. Each time the teacher reaches a higher level, the salary increases by 5%.
Brazilian Review of Econometrics ( ) December
Academic progress is achieved when the teacher qualifies for a higher education degree or completes master's or doctoral courses in the area of education.
Teachers in PEB I career completing graduation pass from level I to level IV.
All teachers that conclude master's and doctoral degrees, evolve to levels IV and V, respectively.
Non-academic progress is based on education, training and professional production factors. In the education factor are considered diplomas of graduation and post-graduation in non-specific areas (not related to education), as well as participation in courses for professional development. The training factor takes into account the participation in lectures, seminars and short courses and the professional production factor considers the publication of articles in scientific journals, books, research reports and didactic material. For each of these indicators there is a distint score and the progress to a higher level requires that the teacher reach a minimum score (Tables 1 and 2 ). The weight of each indicators varies according to the teacher's position in the evaluation levels: at lower levels, the education and training factors are more important and at the higher levels, the professional production are more valuable.
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This figure reveals many important aspects of the salary progression in São Paulo educational system. First, teachers' salaries are approximately 5% higher when they complete five-year in the job. In addition, qualification, training and production also impact teacher compensation. In each service time bracket, five well-defined lines representing teachers' salaries at each level of teacher evaluation are observed. However, relatively few teachers are able to evolve beyond the second level. Among teachers in the same service time bracket, the participation of teachers in the level I is always higher.
1 Teachers who ask to health leave are those who need to move away for long periods for health treatment. This is because short-term absences are considered health absences. Moreover, when the disease is contagious or when the medical certificate states that the health problem is related to the teacher's work (such as voice problems, back pain and stress), the absence does not affect the effective time exercise. Nevertheless, according to the SEE, there are several cases of teachers who have applied for health leave and have had time off from the actual exercise, but have won legal cases against the State so that the length of service is not interrupted. The severity of the illness that motivated the removal should not hinder wages. 2 Considering PEB II teachers, with 30 hours weekly contract. The same pattern is observed for teachers with other work contracts.
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Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use three sources of information: SARESP and period and which are the disciplines that she teaches in each of them, in addition to include demographic and educational data also.
In order to relate the educational performance information of each class to the demographic and work characteristics of their teachers, we match the three databases. The identification of the classes in SARESP and the Census is immediate, since the code of the classes in the two databases is identical (INEP code). The matching of DRHU and Census databases is not trivial. This is because they do not have a common teacher identification. For this reason, we used a pairing procedure of the two bases, using teachers' date of birth, gender and school ID.
In the first stage, we find unique observations of teachers who teach at the same school, are of the same sex and were born the same year. Thus, if at school A, there is only one woman born in 1960 in the Census and DRHU databases, we conclude that she is the same teacher. If there are duplicate observations in one of the databases (for example, two women born in 1960 at the same school), the second stage is included, which includes the information of the month of birth. If duplicity persists, birth-date information is included in the third step of pairing. After pairing the DRHU and Census databases, we were able to obtain the code of the classes for which the teacher attend, so that it is possible to link to each teacher the average proficiency of his students. respectively. After pairing with the Census database, the resulting sample corresponds to 65% of PEB I teachers and 82% of PEB II teachers; 77% of the 5 th grade classes, 98 of the 9 th grade classes and 99% of the high school classes.
3 Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample and compares the groups of treated and untreated teachers. The majority of the teachers are female (74%), have completed higher education (99%), teach in the second cycle 
Identification and Empirical Strategy
The challenge of identifying the causal effect of teachers' salaries on learning is that, in general, the factors that affect the salary progression can be correlated with teachers' quality and, therefore, with the performance of students (qualification). In this paper, we use an exogenous source of wage variation, given by the quinquennial rule. We describe below our empirical strategies and explain the effects they are able of identifying.
How can the quality of the teacher vary according to his salary? Let us imagine that with a higher salary, the teacher is able to reallocate her time and, in this way, to exert more effort in the preparation of material, in the planning of didactic activities and in the improvement of her teaching strategies. If this additional teacher effort has a cumulative impact on student learning, the time elapsed since the teacher received a salary increase has a first-order effect on proficiency. The great problem of identification in this case is that this effect is confused with the effect of the gain of experience of the teacher, since the increase of salary by the rule of quinquennial occurs in her employment birthday.
We assume that the learning technology follows the function described as follow. The key hypothesis here is that the effects of salary and teacher experience on proficiency are independent:
where Y p is the proficiency of the students of teacher p; w t is the teacher's salary which can vary according to t;t is the beginning of the school year and P is the SARESP exam day; Exp p is the teacher's experience in years; and ε p the idiosyncratic teachers' attributes. In this case, the impact of the teacher's salary increase on learning would depend on how long the teacher is receiving higher salaries until the date of proficiency measurement (SARESP examination). If we consider g(·) and f (·) as linear functions and that the salary increase occurs only once in the year, we can rewrite the learning technology function as
where Q p is the date of the teacher's salary increase.
To capture this effect of teacher salary increase on grades, we employ an intra-cohort analysis from a difference-in-differences strategy, which explores parameter β 2 captures the heterogeneity between teachers admitted in different months of the year, that is, it controls the teacher's differences in quality. But the parameter β 3 identifies the effect of salary increase on learning, since it captures differences between teachers with and without quinquennium, between teachers with similar positions in the different entry exams (measured by the month of admission). For this parameter capture the causal impact of the salary increase on proficiency, the identification hypothesis is that the difference in the quality of teachers hired in different months is homogeneous between the different admission cohorts. However, it is precisely the assumption that teachers who occupy similar positions in the ranking of exams and belong to different admission cohorts are equal in unobservable characteristics that influence their quality. This is the traditional hypothesis of difference-in-difference strategies that imposes constraints on the trajectory between groups, but not on the level difference.
At this point, it is important to evaluate what effects our econometric exercises are able of identifying. Since the quinquennial bonus is known and therefore anticipated by the teacher, our estimates refer to a kind of income effect. We can assume that teachers with lower wages decide to engage in other paid activities, for example, classes in municipal and private educational systems With this argument, the specification used in model (1) assumes that the salary effect on student performance occurs cumulatively and linearly. However, it is possible to argue about the existence of other mechanisms through which higher wages would impact performance. Assume that the salary increase instantly promote a behavioral effect that affects the morale of students and therefore their performance. 4 In this case, the net average impact of the cumulative effect of time and the instantaneous effect of the wage increase on the notes could be captured by the specification described by model (2):
in which y ips = grades from class i, teacher p, at school s.
T 1 = dummy that indicates if the teacher has 5 to 9 years of service time.
T 2 = dummy that indicates if the teacher has 10 to 14 years of service time.
T 3 = dummy that indicates if the teacher has 15 to 19 years of service.
T 4 = dummy that indicates whether the teacher has 20 to 24 years of service.
T S p = years of service of teacher p (continuous variable).
X p = vector of teacher characteristics p (gender, color, age, schooling, dummies for 20, 30 and 40-hour work contracts).
X i = vector of characteristics of class i (proportion of boys, proportion of whites, average age, parental education, income indicators).
δ s = fixed effect of the school.
ϑ ips = unobservable variables of class i, of teacher p, at school s.
The treatment dummies (T 1 − T 4 ) indicate in which service time range the teacher is, and therefore, identifies in which salary range the teacher fits.
The coefficients associated with these variables capture the effect of higher wages on the grades, in addition to the effect of teacher's experience under two assumptions. The first hypothesis is that the effect of experience on teacher quality is continuous with the length of service and that this effect is properly controlled by polynomial functions of experience. 5 In this way, each treatment dummy would capture only the salary differences between teachers with and without quinquennia and not their differences of experience in the classroom.
The second hypothesis requires that, conditional on the experience and other characteristics of the teachers, there is no heterogeneity in the quality of the teacher between different cohorts of teachers. In other words, if there are differences in the quality of the teacher among teachers who have entered the educational system at different years, they are controlled by the attributes of the teachers included as controls. This model is estimated from the 2007 SARESP data. With this, we expect to capture only the effect of the wage increase.
The models (1) and (2) were estimated using language and math SARESP grades, for 5 th and 9 th years elementary students and 3 rd year high school students. The regressions for language and math were estimated considering three distinct samples of teachers: a) all matched teachers; b) area specific teachers (respectively, language/humanities and math/sciences); c) specific teachers of the subjects (language and math respectively). The effects of salaries on the average grades were estimated, as well as on the 10, 25, 75 and 90 percentiles of the grade distribution.
Results
Tables 4 to 6 present the results of the models (1) and (2), respectively, for the 5 th and 9 th years of elementary education and for the 3 rd year of high school.
In order to evaluate the impact of the quinquennium for different subgroups of students, we estimate the effects along the distribution of students' grades.
These impacts along the distribution can still be seen in Figures 3 to 5. All these results refer to the estimates that consider the sample of teachers specific to each discipline, that is, in the regressions for math and language, we consider only the teachers who teach each discipline, respectively. This choice is justified by the fact that the results estimated from the three teacher samples (all teachers, area teachers and discipline teachers) are qualitatively similar. We chose to report these results by assuming that if regular wages affect learning, these effects should be greater among the specific teachers in each subject. The coefficients were standardized and therefore measure the effects in terms of standard deviations of the grades.
In Table 4 , we can note that the 5% increase in regular salaries shows a positive correlation with the average language grade in the 5 th year of elementary Notes: Standard error in parentheses. a Coefficient of the interaction between the treatment dummy and the time elapsed since the last job birthday.
b Coefficient of treatment dummy for different cohorts. * * * p < 0.01; * * p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. Source: SARESP, Census of Basic Education and DRHU/SEE.
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( ) December The same can be said for the 9 th year of elementary school and the 3 rd year of high school. In Tables 5 and 6 , we see that there are few coefficients related to the impact of wage increase on proficiency that are statistically significant and even they have a level of significance at only 10%. These results show that, in general, there is no correlation between the 5% salary increase coming from the quinquennial additional and the grades in language and mathematics, either in the estimation of model (1) or model (2). The exception is regression for math in the 3 rd year of high school, estimated from intracohort analysis, which considers the time elapsed since the teacher completed a five-year cycle of service time. In this specification, almost all coefficients are statistically significant and 5%. The estimated points range from 0.528 to 1.135 standard deviations, suggesting salary impacts on proficiency too high to be credible.
In summary, our estimates do not point to robust results of the effects of increases in regular wages on proficiency, which is consistent with most studies in the literature on Economics of Education. The lack of effects of wages on learning good information to reflect the allocation of teachers' time between different professional activities and even the tasks related to the teacher's dedication to school that permit us to speculate on these possibilities.
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Final comments
The remuneration of public school teachers in Brazil is pointed as an important policy for improving the quality of education. In addition, several educational systems have been adopting different remuneration policies for teachers, linked to the performance of their students in proficiency exams. In this article, we study the effects of salary increase of the teachers on the performance of the students in the São Paulo state public educational system, taking advantage of the existence of an exogenous wage variation rule given by the quinquennium rule.
Under this rule, every five years of service time, teachers receive an increase in the regular salary of 5%. The date of admission of teachers is used to evaluate their eligibility for salary increases and the time of exposure of teachers who received additional wages, exploring the differences in the timing of contracting teachers throughout the year. As this gratification is known and therefore anticipated by the teacher, our estimates provide the impact of an income effect on proficiency, whose transmission mechanism could be given by the reallocation of the teacher's time, increasing her availability for beneficial activities for the students.
In order to control the impacts of other variables that may confuse the teachers' salary effect by also depending on the time of admission (for example, experience), in addition to other possible heterogeneities among teacher cohorts, we conduct identification strategies through differences-in-differences, exploring the variation between cohorts and variation over time. The estimates found, however, do not provide empirical evidence to conclude that the increase in regular wages can improve student learning. It is possible to argue that the magnitude of the salary increase given by the service time additional is not sufficient to promote the reallocation of the teacher's time. Or, it may be 6 However, if this is a reasonable mechanism, we would expect that the impacts of increased regular wages on proficiency would be higher among teachers who have the greatest chance of reallocating their time between different professional activities, (12, 20, 30 hours) vis-à-vis those who have a full-time contract (40 hours). For this reason, we estimated the regressions of models (1) and (2) separately for four different samples of teachers, considering their work contract. The results are qualitatively the same.
suggested that although this mechanism is possible, there is no incentive for the teacher to exert more effort, since receipt of the bonus is not linked to learning activities or performance.
